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Relaxing constraints as a conservation policy
Ben Groomy

Charles Palmerz

Abstract
Eco-entrepreneurs in developing countries are often subject to market or institutional constraints, e.g. via credit rationing or missing markets. Conservation interventions which relax
constraints may be both cost-e¤ective and poverty reducing. A simulation using data from an
intervention in Madagascar to relax the technological constraints of forest honey production
investigates this possibility. Cost-e¤ectively achieving dual environment-development goals is
shown to depend on the severity of constraints, relative prices and, importantly, the nature of
technology. Success is more likely for technologies exhibiting close to constant returns to scale
or high input complementarity. Forest honey does not meet these requirements, whereas sustainable forest management may well do. Ultimately, where market or institutional constraints
are present, knowledge of the recipient technology is required for more informed, e¢ cient and
perhaps, more politically-acceptable conservation policy.
JEL: H21, Q28.
Keywords: Payments for Environmental Services (PES), market constraints, cost-e¤ectiveness,
e¢ ciency.
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Introduction

Policies that emphasise the use of incentives to conserve ecosystems such as forests have emerged as
potentially cost-e¤ective alternatives to command-and-control instruments (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002;
Bulte and Engel, 2006). In particular, payments are o¤ered directly, sometimes in the form of cash
subsidies, to policy recipients in exchange for conserving forest, e.g. Payments for Environmental
Services (Pagos por Servicios Ambientales) in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008). Incentives can also be
provided indirectly by donors via some associated input to joint production of private and public
goods, e.g. subsidies for capital inputs to eco-tourism or forest honey production (Wunder, 2000;
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Bradbear, 2009). In developing countries, such interventions often aim to improve the incomes and
livelihoods of the poor while conserving ecosystems.
A trade-o¤ between inducing cost-e¤ective forest conservation and raising the pro…ts of an ‘ecoentrepreneur’ was demonstrated by Ferraro and Simpson (2002). They show that when markets
are perfect and side payments are not possible, a budget-constrained donor always prefers PES to
the more indirect approach due to the former’s cost-e¤ectiveness. The eco-entrepreneur, say a local
eco-tourist operator or honey producer, on the other hand, prefers the indirect approach since she
pro…ts from the additional transfers required. Cost-e¤ectiveness is thus analysed in terms of the
relative deadweight losses associated with each type of policy. Groom and Palmer (2010), on the
other hand, show that where eco-entrepreneurs face market and institutional constraints, e.g. input
constraints or credit rationing, policies which relax these may be both cost-e¤ective for donors and
pro…t enhancing for the eco-entrepreneur. This is due to released rents over and above the donor’s
payments, known as constraint rents. Therefore, relaxing a constraint is more e¢ cient than PES if
these rents outweigh the relative deadweight losses.
In this paper, we further investigate the conditions under which each type of policy might be
preferred, respectively, by a donor and an eco-entrepreneur involved in joint production. Specifically, we return to the empirical application used by Ferraro and Simpson (2002) - forest honey
production in Madagascar - and develop a method for de…ning and assessing the relaxation of an
observed constraint. We focus our analysis for the case of honey production for two reasons. First, it
allows us to compare our results directly with those of Ferraro and Simpson (2002). Second, honey
production has been promoted by NGOs and donors both as a means of improving livelihoods and
conserving forests in some developing countries (see Bradbear, 2009).
The constraint observed in Madagascar is technological and applies to capital inputs used in
production, which are subsidised and purchased by local NGOs. Relaxing this constraint enables
producers to switch from traditional to semi-modern beehives. We then test the sensitivity of the
results to relative price and technological parameters. This reveals that while relaxing constraints to
forest honey production is unlikely to be cost-e¤ective compared to PES, it might be more e¢ cient.
2
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Cost-e¤ectiveness is also shown to be highly dependent on the features of production, particularly
returns to scale and input complementarity. A discussion follows about other production settings
in which our innovative method of characterising the constraint might be applied, which include
sustainable forest management (SFM), shade co¤ee production or where in situ technical expertise
is missing.
The results are important because contrary to the perfect market and institutional setting
of Ferraro and Simpson (2002), constraints, institutional failures and market failures are the rule
rather than the exception in many developing countries (Ellis, 1998; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2005).
Therefore, providing credit, expertise and technology, or more secure land rights in such settings
might be more cost-e¤ective interventions for increasing forest cover compared with the use of
…nancial incentives such as PES. Our results also indicate that the evaluation of cost-e¤ectiveness
is not su¢ cient to evaluate the desirability of the programme. In a constrained world, e¢ ciency
and distributional issues are also important determinants of success (FAO, 2010).
The paper proceeds as follows. From Ferraro and Simpson (2002) and Groom and Palmer
(2010), we …rst restate the conditions necessary for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor and
the impact on the eco-entrepreneur’s pro…ts, in Section 2. The model is then calibrated for forest
honey producers using data collected from Madagascar, in Section 3. We develop a method of
de…ning the technological constraint and assessing the policy that was implemented to relax this.
In Section 4, we present our results, including a comparison with those of Ferraro and Simpson
(2002). Following from a sensitivity analysis in Section 5, Section 6 discusses the implications of
the results, in particular focusing on the broader applicability of our method to de…ne and measure
technological constraints, i.e. in other settings.

3
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2

Conditions for e¢ ciency and the preferences of the donor and
eco-entrepreneur

We begin by summarising the theoretical conditions for e¢ ciency, cost-e¤ectiveness to the donor
and the impact on the eco-entrepreneur’s pro…ts (or income) of conserving forest either indirectly
via the expansion of a joint production activity or directly via payments for forest land. These conditions form the basis for the empirical simulation. Groom and Palmer (2010) extended Ferraro and
Simpson (2002) to develop these conditions for a pro…t-maximising yet input-constrained producer
with concave production function Q = F (K; F ) using capital (K) and forest (F ) as inputs. Prices
for output, Q; and inputs are given by PQ , PK and PF , respectively. Market and institutional
imperfections are introduced via the presence of a binding constraint on capital, K. The conditions
follow from the comparative statics of the constrained pro…t function, in contrast to the unconstrained case analysed by Ferraro and Simpson (2002). In particular, when input (output) markets
are constrained and rationing by quantity occurs, the relevant decision price for the entrepreneur
is no longer the market price PK but the higher (lower) ‘virtual’price, Pv : Hence, a constraint rent
exists, Pv

PK , which measures the value of relaxing the constraint. Groom and Palmer (2010)

provide the technical details for both input and output constraints.

2.1

E¢ ciency

E¢ ciency is evaluated by comparing the e¢ ciency losses and gains associated with relaxing constraints with those of paying for the conservation of forest land through a PES scheme. The latter
payment is given by dPF . For an eco-entrepreneur facing a capital constraint K; where the unit
resource cost of relaxing the constraint is the underlying market price PK , forest-land payments
are more e¢ cient if:

dC =

dK
2

dPvI

dPvD

relative deadweight losses

Pv0

PK dK > 0

(1)

constraint rent

4
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where dC is the incremental cost of relaxing constraints compared to forest-land payments, dK is
the amount of capital required to increase forest land, and Pv0 is the initial virtual price of capital.1
The term dPvI is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of relaxing the constraint
on capital while dPvD is the change in the virtual price of capital as a consequence of the forest-land
payment. Given the assumptions, the former is negative and the latter is positive. The second
term is the constraint rent associated with relaxing the constraint, and is positive. Hence, the sign
of dC, and the relative e¢ ciency of the two policies is indeterminate.

2.2

The donor’s preferred policy

The donor must either pay

F dPF , directly for forest land, or PK dK under the policy of relaxing

constraints. A donor concerned solely with cost-e¤ectiveness prefers payments if:
F dPF < PK dK

(2)

This condition becomes:
U
KF
C
FF
C
ij

where
and

U
ij

<

U
KK

+

1 @K
P0
K @Pv v

PK

(3)

is the constrained elasticity of demand for input i with respect to the price of input j,

is the unconstrained equivalent. This reveals the dependence on features of the technology:

the virtual price elasticity of demand for capital,
constraint, Pv0

U ;
KK

the constraint rent associated with the

PK ; the unconstrained cross-price elasticity of inputs,

own-price elasticity of demand for forest land,

C .
FF

U ;
KF

and, the constrained

Super…cially, condition (3) states that the donor

prefers forest payments rather relaxing constraints when: the constraint rent is low; the demand
for forest is inelastic with respect to price; and, capital and forests are highly complementary
(high

U ):
KF

In reality, the condition is more complicated since the virtual price Pv depends on the

elasticities.

2.3

The eco-entrepreneur’s preferred policy

When the eco-entrepreneur is constrained in an input market, for small changes in PF or K, her
pro…ts will change, respectively, as follows:
5
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d
d

C
F

=

C
K

@ C
dPF =
@PF

=

F dPF

@ C
dK = Pv0 dK
@K

Hence, if the donor pays the resource cost of relaxing the constraint, the eco-entrepreneur prefers
a payment for forest land if:

F dPF > Pv0 dK

(4)

This condition becomes:
U
KF
C
FF

>

U
KK

(5)

This shows that when the demand for forest land and capital are highly complementarity, in the
sense of there being a large, positive, unconstrained cross-price elasticity,
constrained own-price elasticity of forest,

C ,
FF

U ;
KF

and where the

is inelastic, then the eco-entrepreneur will prefer to

participate in PES since it requires a larger payment. It is in direct tension with condition (3) for
the donor.
However, despite this tension, when the constraint rent is positive, Pv0 > PK , conditions (2)
and (4) can hold simultaneously in favour of relaxing constraints so that both the donor and
eco-entrepreneur will prefer this. The area of agreement is large whenever the constraint rent is
large, i.e. due to a high, positive value of Pv0 . Relaxing constraints can, in principle, provide
cost-e¤ective conservation of forest land for the donor while also providing a large transfer to the
eco-entrepreneur through the released constraint rent. Once again, since the virtual price, Pv ;
depends on the elasticities in condition (3) and (5), more investigation is required to illustrate
which intervention is preferred and under what circumstances.
In summary, given the technological assumptions three outcomes are possible depending on the
cost of the intervention: i) donors prefer forest-land payments through a PES scheme and producers
prefer relaxation of constraints; ii) both parties prefer relaxation of constraints; iii) donors prefer
relaxing constraints and eco-entrepreneurs prefer PES. While Ferraro and Simpson’s (2002) results
6
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper714

6

Groom and Palmer: Relaxing Constraints as a Conservation Policy

held for all homothetic technologies, this result does not depend primarily on homotheticity and
may hold for a wider variety of technologies.

3

Policy choice to conserve forest in Central Menabe, Madagascar

3.1

Background

The eco-entrepreneur in our case study is the forest honey producer of Central Menabe, located on
the west coast of Madagascar. They are observed to receive a new and more productive technology
for honey production as the result of a donor intervention. This strategy is observed to relax a
technological constraint on production. Market and institutional constraints have long been observed in Madagascar, particularly in agricultural and credit markets. These contribute to poverty
among rural households (see, for example, Barratt and Dorosh, 1996; Minten and Barratt, 2008).2
Honey producing households reside in poor, resource-dependent communities located at the
edge of a bio-diverse rich, dry forest. Preserving biodiversity in the area, including a number of
endemic and currently endangered animal species, is one of the greatest ecological challenges that
Madagascar faces (Nicoll, 2003). Deforestation via slash-and-burn agriculture occurs at an annual
rate of 1 percent (Scales, 2007).
Numerous NGOs, both local and international, and donors alike operate in the region primarily
(but not necessarily exclusively) to conserve biodiversity. For example, the Durrell Wildlife Trust
has been experimenting with an environmental auction among local communities to participate in
biodiversity monitoring. Conservation payments were paid out to the ‘winners’of the auction. In
our study area, NGOs have been considering various interventions including PES and eco-tourism
as a means of raising incomes and conserving forest (Dirac, 2009). They have also been providing
support to households for the expansion of beekeeping and honey production.
Beekeeping and honey production is well-established in Central Menabe, although usually only
as an income complement to agriculture.3 Bees forage in diverse natural and secondary forest formations in the vicinity of beehives. Households engaged in honey production are observed to use
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two types of beehive, typically located in or around villages: traditional and semi-modern. In traditional beekeeping, beehives are typically single, large empty logs found in the forest, closed on each
side with only very small apertures for the bees. For semi-modern beekeeping, farmers use semimodern beehives, generally Langstroth or Kenyan models. Semi-modern hives are more spacious
than the traditional ones with honey produced on ‘cadres’ inside, which need to be periodically
removed and the honey gathered (Dirac, personal communication).
To calibrate the model we use primary data on agricultural activities and non-timber forest
products, including beekeeping, collected between 2005 and 2007 (Dirac, 2009).4 On average, a
honey-producing household owns 1.84 beehives, of which 1.2 and 0.64 are classi…ed as traditional
and semi-modern, respectively. Including labour costs to build and maintain over the course of a
year, traditional beehives cost US$ 8.10 per unit while semi-modern hives cost US$ 23.82. Note,
however, that semi-modern hives are not constructed locally. Instead, they are donated by local
NGOs. Hence, the price of semi-modern hives is the market price paid by the NGO in addition
to the costs of training local households to use the hives e¤ectively. No market for semi-modern
hives exists in the study-area villages. A traditional beehive produces an average of 15 litres of
honey per year while the more productive semi-modern type produces 32 litres annually. Honey
is typically sold in the villages, either to locals or middlemen who then sell honey in more distant
markets. During the study period, honey prices remained stable at around US$ 2.87 per litre.
Honey production requires forest land as an input. Indeed, honey yield has been found to
increase with proximity to forest (see Sande et al., 2009). It also requires labour and capital inputs
more or less in …xed proportions. In principle, therefore, a donor wishing to conserve forests could
purchase forest land or capital inputs. Both would simultaneously enhance honey production while
employing more forest land in production.

8
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3.2
3.2.1

Calibration of constrained honey production
The technology

Ferraro and Simpson (2002) characterise the semi-modern technology of honey production in Madagascar. Given our limited data, we return to their characterisation of the following Cobb-Douglas
production function: Q = AK F , where Q is honey production, A is a productivity parameter,
and

are the elasticities of capital and forest, respectively, K and F . Due to gaps in our own

data, we utilise the following parameter values estimated by Ferraro and Simpson (ibid). The
technology has strong diminishing returns to scale in that
In addition,

and

= 0:36 and

= 0:15, with A = 48.

re‡ect a low output elasticity of capital, K, and particularly forest, F . This

deterministically captures the low complementarity between F and K and the loose relationship
between honey production and forests that might arise from non-rivalry.

3.2.2

The constraint and behavioural assumptions

Our data contain no explicit de…nition of the individual constraints faced by honey producers.
Nevertheless, the presence of two types of beehive in the sample, semi-modern and traditional,
allows us to identify and characterise the production constraint when combined with assumptions
concerning the production technology. In particular, semi-modern beehives are twice as productive
as traditional ones, and are only used by recipients of assistance from NGOs working in the area.
This provides a prima facie case for the existence of a technological constraint underpinned by
a capital constraint, which is being relaxed by external donor intervention. We characterise the
constraint as follows.
We …rst de…ne the traditional technology as being a nested version of the semi-modern technology, di¤ering only in the e¤ective capital embodied in each beehive. Thus, we de…ne the technology
in terms of e¤ective capital EK: Q = A (EK) F , where E = 1 for the traditional technology,
and E > 1 for the semi-modern technology. K represents the number of beehives and E represents
the di¤erences in the construction of traditional and semi-modern. EK can be understood as the

9
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interior surface area for honey production.5 Characterising the technology in this way allows us to
represent the traditional technology as a capital-constrained version of the semi-modern technology.
In what follows, we calibrate the values of E and K.
We assume that both traditional and semi-modern producers are pro…t maximisers conditional
T ; P ; ET =
on their own technology and the associated prices. This de…nes supply functions: QT (PK
F
SM ; P ; E SM , for each technology. These di¤er only because of the values of the
1) and QSM PK
F
T and P SM , respectively.
parameter E and the price of traditional and semi-modern beehives, PK
K

To de…ne the parameter E for semi-modern producers we use the observation that the pro…tmaximising output of traditional production is approximately half that of unconstrained semimodern production: QSM = 2QT . This leads to the following de…nition of E SM :

SM
T
QSM PK
; PF ; E SM = 2QT PK
; PF ; E T = 1

(6)

With E SM de…ned, it is then possible to de…ne the e¤ective capital constraint, K, faced by traditional producers in terms of the semi-modern technology:

SM
SM
QSM PK
; PF ; E SM = 2QSM PK
; PF ; E SM ; K

(7)

SM ; P ; E SM ; K = QT P T ; P ; E T = 1 . That
The implication of (6) and (7) is that QSM PK
F
F
K

is, unconstrained traditional producers are modelled as constrained semi-modern producers.
The assumptions underlying our method of characterising the capital constraint have the following implications. Both the traditional and the constrained semi-modern producers have constrained
supply curves (Q) and constrained demand curves for forest, F C (:) ; that are identical in PF

space.

However, the demand for e¤ective capital di¤ers between these two technologies, with the latent
demand for e¤ective capital much higher for semi-modern capital due to its higher productivity.
Relaxing the capital constraint assumes that the honey producer is assisted in shifting from one
technology to another as additional semi-modern hives are provided as part of the policy approach.
Thus, the impact of this approach is analysed along the semi-modern demand curve rather than

10
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the traditional.
There are two possible constrained scenarios when considering forest-land payments. First, a
partially-constrained analysis in which payments induce additional traditional hives to be employed,
K T . Second, a totally-constrained scenario in which capital remains constrained at K. We
compare both scenarios to relaxing the constraint, K, with semi-modern capital.

3.3

De…ning the constraint: The constrained and unconstrained solutions

SM ; P T ; P ;
We use the following parameter values from the data for the simulation: [ ; ; A; PK
K
Q

QSM =QT ] = [0:36; 0:15; 48; 24; 8; 3; 2]. Table 1 shows the solutions to the traditional technology,
the semi-modern and the constrained semi-modern technologies.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Solving for E SM using (6) leads to E SM = 7:7. The semi-modern technology, with its greater
e¤ective capital, produces greater quantities and pro…ts while using more forest with fewer beehives.
Using (7) to solve for the capital constraint yields: K = 2:4. This re‡ects the ‘e¤ective’ capital
constraint faced by producers using traditional technology in terms of the semi-modern technology,
as seen in the semi-modern constrained scenario in row three of Table 1.6
The simulation has two parts. First, we estimate the forest payment, dPF , and the amount of
capital, dK, required to increase forest. We follow Ferraro and Simpson (2002) in analysing the cost
of the intervention required to e¤ect a 0.1 ha change in forest for a single producer, assuming that
ten producers are subject to the intervention. We estimate forest-land payments for the two possible
constrained scenarios described above, partial and total. Second, we undertake a comparison of
these results to the case where market conditions are ignored. That is, where it is assumed that
the producer is unconstrained and responds to payments, either to forest land or capital, dPF and
dPK . In all cases we treat both capital and forest-land inputs as a ‡ow despite the potential for
capital to be a one-o¤ intervention.

11
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4

Results: forest payments vs relaxation of the constraint

4.1

What is e¢ cient?

The e¢ cient intervention is determined by condition (1). If the incremental cost, dC, is negative
then the honey producer prefers constraints to be relaxed.7 Given the technological assumptions
this condition holds and the e¢ cient intervention, i.e. that which generates the greatest aggregate
bene…t, is for constraints to be relaxed.8
Table 2 details the impact of the interventions. In the totally-constrained case, the deadweight
loss when constraints are relaxed is US$ 3:2 compared to one of US$ 0:35 when a forest-land payment
is made. However, there is a large e¢ ciency gain as a consequence of relaxing the constraint, which
is measured by the released constraint rent of US$ 26:4. The incremental cost of employing a
payment rather than relaxing the capital constraint in this case is therefore US$ 23:6:
[TABLE 2 HERE]
In e¤ect, the donor’s contributions release extra resources which contribute both to the environmental objective and the welfare of the producer and hence, could improve the latter. But if the
donor is concerned only with the much narrower objective of cost-e¤ectiveness, then it will prefer
forest payments to supplying capital inputs, as shown below.

4.2

What the donor prefers

The donor’s preferences are determined by equation (3). With the decreasing returns to scale
(DRS) technology of honey production this condition becomes:

Pv0

PK < 0. That is, the donor

prefers to make a forest-land payment if the ‘augmented’ constraint rent,

Pv0

PK is less than

zero, which is the case with the parameter values used here.9 Table 2 shows the implications for
the producer’s pro…ts and donor’s costs in both the partially- and totally-constrained cases. In the
latter, US$ 6:17 is required to induce an increase of 0.1 ha. Since the donor must pay for all units
of forest employed, on average 0:98 ha, not just the marginal units, the total cost per producer is:
F dPF = 6:05. The total cost over 10 producers is US$ 60:5.10 In the former, producers are more
12
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responsive and the cost to the donor is reduced to US$ 54:3. Re‡ecting equation (3), this shows
that forest-land payments become less cost-e¤ective the more constrained the honey producer.
Table 2 also shows the outcome of an intervention to relax constraints.11 Although 0:7 additional
units of capital (approximately 1.5 beehives) are required to induce the required increase in forest
SM = 24. On the basis of costland, the donor’s cost across ten households is US$ 168 where PK

e¤ectiveness, it is clear that the donor would prefer the payment for forest land. This would save
around US$ 108 per ha of forest conserved, with a greater saving if producers can introduce more
traditional beehives in response.

4.3

What the honey producer prefers

The honey producer’s preferences are determined by the inequality shown in (4). With the DRS
technology he will prefer the intervention to relax constraints if
since

< 1, which is clearly the case

= 0:15. Table 2 shows the implications for the producer’s pro…ts and the donor’s costs

in both the partially- and totally-constrained scenarios. The increase in pro…ts from the forestland payment is only US$ 5.1 or US$ 5.7 in these respective scenarios. While these payments are
increasingly desirable to the producer when it is more constrained, the impact on pro…t should be
compared to a change of over US$ 40 when constraints are relaxed. A signi…cant portion of the
latter is the released constraint rent

Pv0

SM dK , which is indicated by dCR in Table 2 and
PK

estimated to be approximately US$ 26:4.12
In summary, when considering market conditions for the case of Malagasy honey producers, the
preferences of the donor and the producer remain in tension regardless of whether the producer
can adjust traditional capital or not. This …nding accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) who
ignored market conditions. Hence, even where honey producers are technologically constrained,
conservation and income objectives remain in tension from the perspective of the donor: the coste¤ective strategy does not induce the greatest transfer to the producer.

13
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4.4

What if we ignore market conditions?

The lower part of Table 2 shows the results when honey producers are assumed to be unconstrained
pro…t maximisers. We analyse the response of an unconstrained semi-modern producer to forest
payments or subsidies to capital, rather than relaxing capital constraints. As well as placing donor
and producer in tension, ignoring market conditions makes these transfers look more cost-e¤ective
than they actually are. This can be seen in the underestimation of the costs to the donor of US$
53.9 rather than US$ 60.5 per ha of conserved forest for a totally-constrained producer. On the
other hand, the bene…ts to producers are underestimated: US$ 5.2 instead of US$ 5.7.

5

Sensitivity analysis

In the case of Madagascar the donor prefers payments for forest land even when market conditions
are considered. The producer, on the other hand, prefers capital constraints to be relaxed. The
e¢ cient course of action is to relax constraints in honey production. As the following sensitivity
analysis now illustrates, these results are sensitive to the nature of the joint production technology
as well as the relative prices of inputs and outputs.
We focus on parameters that describe the Cobb-Douglas technology:
scale k =

,

and the returns to

+ , and restrict attention to the more plausible decreasing returns to scale case (DRS).

In the DRS case the conditions under which the donor and eco-entrepreneur both prefer to relax
constraints (conditions (2) and (4), respectively) can be combined to yield Pv0 > Pv0 > PK (Groom
and Palmer, 2009): The …rst inequality shows that in most circumstances the eco-entrepreneur will
prefer constraints to be relaxed, since it requires

< 1. This leaves two of the possible outcomes

outlined in Section 2.3: either the donor prefers the forest payment and the eco-entrepreneur prefers
relaxing constraints, or both agree on relaxing constraints. Whether or not tension exists between
the agents on the appropriate intervention depends on the donor’s preferences. In the Cobb-Douglas
case the donor prefers to relax constraints if the augmented constraint rent is positive:

14
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Pv0

PK > 0

(8)

The augmented constraint rent is closely related to the constraint rent Pv0 PK ; which conditions
(2) and (4) showed to be pivotal in general. Taking K as given, the sensitivity of the donor’s
preferred choice of intervention to technological parameters

and

those values that equate the augmented constraint rent to zero:

can be evaluated by plotting
Pv0

PK = 0.13 This yields

the upper curved line in Figure 1, which is given by Equation (2). To compare this to other DRS
technologies, combinations of

and

above the upper curved line such that

such that
+

+

= k are also plotted: Values of

and

< 1 yield a positive, augmented constraint rent.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 reveals that the characteristics of the technology determine whether the augmented
constraint rent is positive for any given constraint. Agents might agree to relax constraints when
there is large

and , which has two interesting interpretations in the Cobb-Douglas case. First,

the constrained elasticity of forest with respect to the capital constraint,
increasing in

and

C
FK

=

= (1

), is

: This indicates that where forest and capital are highly complementary in

production, the donor will prefer to relax constraints because only small increments of capital are
required to achieve an increase in forest conservation. Second, large

and

indicates higher

returns to scale. Figure 1 shows that the closer technology is to constant returns to scale (CRS)
the more likely it is that the donor will prefer relaxing constraints to forest-land payments. In sum,
increased complementarity and higher returns to scale increase the augmented constraint rent and
make relaxing constraints more favourable.14
Fixing returns to scale such that
values of

and

+

= k reveals that intermediate, rather than extreme,

are more likely to lead to the relaxation of constraints being preferred by donors.

In the Cobb-Douglas case a general interpretation of this observation is that donors are less likely
to prefer to relax constraints where technologies are either highly capital or forest intensive. This
re‡ects the tradeo¤ between complementarity, forest-price elasticity and other determinants of
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the augmented constraint rent. For instance, holding returns to scale …xed, an increase in
towards extreme values simultaneously decreases complementarity and increases the price elasticity
of demand for forest

C
FF

= 1= (

1) thus making forest-land payments preferable to the eco-

entrepreneur. Furthermore, although high values of

increase complementarity, when returns to

scale are held constant the augmented constraint rent eventually declines as

diminishes. Figure

2 in the appendix shows that the precise relationship depends on relative prices.
The parameter values for forest honey production are indicated in Figure 1. Here, returns to
scale are strongly decreasing since k =
low since

and

are small:

=(

1) =

on the other hand, is relatively large, at
and there are no values of

and

+ = 0:51. Complementarity between forest and capital is
0:42: The constrained price elasticity of forest demand,
1:56. Ultimately, the donor prefers forest-land payments,

such that the donor would prefer to relax constraints at the

existing returns to scale.
Similar results hold when one abstracts from the individual agents and considers overall e¢ ciency (Equation 1). In Figure 1 the lower curved line plots values of

and

for which forest-land

payments and relaxing constraints are equally e¢ cient. Above the line relaxing constraints is ef…cient and the range of values for which this is the case is larger and includes honey production.
This re‡ects the fact that the full welfare e¤ect includes the released constraint rent over and above
any payments. Hence if a Coasian bargain over the constraint rent could be struck between donor
and eco-entrepreneur then the donor might be persuaded to opt for relaxing constraints.

6

Discussion and conclusions

In addressing the cost-e¤ectiveness of conservation payments, Ferraro and Simpson (2002) abstracted from the important fact that there are likely to be multiple market failures in developing
world conservation-related enterprises. Their …nding that direct approaches to conservation are
much more cost-e¤ective than indirect approaches is therefore suspect. In this paper we investigate
empirically the market and institutional conditions under which di¤erent policy interventions to in-
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duce forest conservation are e¢ cient, cost-e¤ective and agreed upon by donor and eco-entrepreneur
alike. Identifying these conditions may assist in choice of policy instrument in constrained market
and institutional settings, and indicate when dual environmental and income-enhancing goals are
likely to be achieved via conservation payments.
The main …nding in relation to honey production in Madagascar is that relaxing constraints is
unlikely to be cost-e¤ective for the donor, despite a clear technological constraint. Stark decreasing
returns to scale and weak relationships between capital and forest inputs tend to favour payments
to conserve forest land despite the severity of the constraint. This result is strengthened when
one considers what is left out of the production analysis. For example, the link between capital
and forest might be weaker still considering the public good nature of forests, to the extent that
this is not re‡ected in the DRS technology. The honey producer, however, prefers technological
constraints to be relaxed due to the transfer of constraint rents. Without side payments the two
actors prefer di¤erent interventions and hence environmental and income-generation objectives are
in tension. Such tensions can be detrimental to the success of conservation schemes (FAO, 2009).
Nonetheless, even in the case of forest honey production relaxing constraints generates an overall
welfare gain since the released constraint rent is larger than any deadweight loss. Hence, relaxing
constraints could be preferred by both parties (Pareto improving) if side payments/matching funds
(lower PK ) or some other form of Coasian bargain were possible. Alternatively, if the donor factors
in e¢ ciency gains, i.e. both environmental and development goals, into its objective then again,
the two objectives could be achieved simultaneously. This might be the case, for example, for
donors looking to include poverty alleviation as a ‘co-bene…t’of policy to Reduce Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD).
Our conclusion in relation to honey production accords with Ferraro and Simpson (2002) in the
sense that the donor will not favour indirect conservation schemes. Yet, this comes at the cost of
overall e¢ ciency. Our analysis of relaxing market/institutional constraints can be applied to other
joint production activities. Of particular relevance is the characterisation of relaxing constraints as
the provision of input-augmenting technological change. For instance, one of the main constraints to
17
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sustainable forest management (SFM) and agro-forestry activities such as shade co¤ee production
is technical capacity (FAO, 2009). Capacity building by donors and governments can be represented
in our framework by a labour-augmenting technological change. Such interventions are frequently
implemented by NGOs and international donors. They are also often seen as a crucial component of
PES interventions in developing countries, for example, Ecuador’s PROFAFOR (Programa Face de
Forestación) and Nicaragua’s FONADEFO (El Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal ) schemes.
Another technological constraint to the speci…c example of SFM concerns capital in the form of
monitoring and veri…cation technologies. These have also been the subject of donor intervention,
e.g. in Ecuador. Although not technological, credit rationing is also a constraint to SFM, which
has high initial costs of tree-planting. Similarly, credit constraints were found to be a major cause
of the abandonment of shade co¤ee plantations in Mexico (see Blackman et al., 2005). Financial instruments such as forestry funds and environmental bond guarantees could help relax these
constraints (FAO, 2009). Our analysis shows that such interventions could be cost-e¤ective.
More generally, Groom and Palmer (2009) show that there is a symmetric problem in which
relaxing constraints can reduce input use in activities which degrade or convert forest, such as
agriculture. A typical example is o¤-farm labour constraints, which can reduce on-farm labour and
land use if these inputs are complementary. Not only are such constraints commonplace, but input
complementarity in this context is arguably more plausible than in the case of an ecoentrepreneur.
Marchand (2010) and Groom et al. (2010) found such agricultural technologies in the Brazilian
Amazon and China, respectively. Constant returns to scale are also more likely in such cases (e.g.
Cornia, 1985; Marchand, 2010).
The idea of relaxing constraints to o¤-farm activities in order to induce cost-e¤ective forest
conservation has also been examined in numerous studies. O¤-farm labour constraints, such as
those documented in Nepal, the Phillipines, and China (e.g. Blu¤stone 1995; Shively and Pagiola,
2004; Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2009) arise due to involuntary unemployment, weak land tenure and
missing property rights, and institutional constraints to mobility, e.g. the Hukou system in China.15
Relaxing such constraints may achieve dual environmental and income-generating objectives. For
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example, in the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP), the relaxation of liquidity and o¤farm labour market constraints succeeded in both reducing poverty and providing environmental
bene…ts (Gauvin et al., 2009; Uchida et al., 2009). Shively and Pagiola (2004) …nd similar results
in the Phillipines. Such cases illustrate the additional bene…t of harmonising the preferences of
stakeholders, an oft-cited requirement for the success of conservation schemes (FAO, 2009).
There are some obvious limitations to the analysis however. One caveat is that the results
are underpinned by pro…t maximisation. If agricultural producers are satis…cing, relaxing input
constraints would be much less e¤ective in conserving forest and improving welfare. Forest-land
payments via a PES scheme would also be ine¤ective in this case.16 Relaxing constraints in agricultural technology, on the other hand, could reduce agricultural land use. Similarly, where cash
payments are used, ine¤ectiveness may be further reinforced by local resistance to the use of such
payments, as has been observed in Madagascar (see, for example, Pollini 2008; Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007). Where recipients engage in several activities, it may be possible for the
physical or human capital supplied in an intervention to be deployed in a non-conservation activity.
This issue of fungibility speaks to the broader issue of monitoring and enforcement, which a¤ects
both types of intervention considered. Lastly, while we have been able to characterise and quantify
the constraint in the case of honey production, relaxing some of the other constraints discussed
is often more di¢ cult. Governments’ attempts to relaxing credit constraints or improve market
access, for instance, have not always led to welfare improvements.
Ultimately, reaching dual policy goals suggests a need for targeting not only with respect to
choice of technology but also with respect to space. While macro-level studies suggest a direct
correlation between poverty and environment (see Sachs et al., 2009), micro-level evidence suggests
that policies such as PES are not necessarily bene…ting the poor for various reasons including the
presence of market and institutional constraints (see Engel et al., 2008). Conversely, targeting PES
towards the poor may have reduced environmental bene…ts in some schemes, e.g. the SLCP in
China (Uchida et al., 2009). Nevertheless, where constrained producers and environmental assets
coincide, approaches that relax market and institutional constraints could well represent both a
19
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cost-e¤ective and welfare-enhancing alternative to PES. If true it would answer recent calls for
environmentalists to pay more attention to development issues and developmentalists to pay more
attention to environmental goals while in pursuit of the Millennium Development Goals.
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Tables
Technology

E

K

F

Q

Traditional

1

18.5

0.88

134.5

201.0

Semi-modern (constrained)

7.7

2.4

0.88

134.5

201.0

Semi-modern (unconstrained)

7.7

12.3

1.76

269.0

402.0

Table 1: Characterisation of the technology constraint

Constrained analysis (total, K; and partial,
Cost to donor
Policy intervention

K T ; constraints)
Impact on producer

1 ha

Per hshld

dK or dPF

dQ

d

CR

dCR

DW L

54.3

5.43

5.54

3.4

5.1

NA

NA

0.31

Forest-land payment 2 K

60.5

6.05

6.17

2.2

5.7

38.7

0

0.35

Capital subsidy

168.0

16.80

0.71

15. 4

40.0

29.2

26.4

3.21

Forest-land payment 1

KT

Unconstrained analysis (following Ferraro and Simpson, 2002)
Policy intervention

1 ha

Per hshld

dPF or dPK

dQ

d

CR

dCR

DW L

Forest-land payment

53.9

5.39

2.91

3.5

5.2

NA

NA

1.48

Capital subsidy

244.1

24.4

1.74

15.3

22.9

NA

NA

1.55

Table 2: Price subsidies vs relaxing constraints, constrained vs unconstrained (US$)
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9

Figure Titles

Figure 1. Donor’s preferences over policy intervention and relaxing constraints: variation with
technological parameters and returns to scale ( ;

and k =

+ )

Figure 2. Donor’s preferences over policy intervention: technology ( and

) and the price of

capital (PK ).
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Notes
1

The superscript 0 refers to the pre-intervention level of a variable and superscript 1 refers to the post-intervention

level. Similarly, I refers to interventions which relax constraints and D refers to forest-land payments.
2

In 2005, 68.7 percent of Malagasies lived below the poverty line, a …gure which rose to 73.5 percent in rural areas

(PNAE 2008).
3

A household in the study area cultivates an average of 1.86 hectares (ha) per year, typically rice, maize, cassava

and peanuts.
4

For example, during this time, 288 household questionnaires on local agricultural production were undertaken in

six villages, while another survey comprising a further 70 questionnaires were carried out in regional markets. Further
qualitative interviews were undertaken in four villages to obtain detailed information about beekeeping.
5

Bradbear (2009) describes this as one major distinction between the traditional and semi-traditional technologies,

alongside the need for training to use the latter.
6

In e¤ect, by determining E M = 7:7 we have determined that K = K T =7:7 = 2:4: We could have determined the

constraint on the basis of equating pro…ts between traditional and constrained semi-modern production. Not only is
this not what we observe but this makes the constraint even more severe and hence, tips the balance even more in
favour of relaxing constraints.
7

Groom and Palmer (2010) show that this condition can be re-written as: PK <

1
2

Pv1I + Pv1D , where Pv1I and

Pv1D are the shadow prices of capital after relaxing constraints and paying for forest land, respectively.
8

The expression for the shadow price Pv is given by: Pv0 = AE

KC

1
AE

PF
(K C )

1

; which is used to

evaluate Pv1I and Pv1D numerically.
9

The proof is available on request. Under the current parameters the expression

< PK =Pv0 is: 0:15 < 24=61:4 =

0:39.
10
11

F:dPF =

6:17 = 6:05, where 6.17 is the payment per hectare for a single producer.

0:98

For the constrained case, column 3 measures

F dPF for forest-land payments and

of the capital constraint. For the unconstrained case, column 3 shows

SM
PK
dK for the relaxation

F dPF for forest-land payments, or

SM
KdPK

for relaxation of the constraint.
12

The initial constraint rent Pv0

SM
PK
is US$ 37:7. Under forest-land payments this increases to US$ 38:7 as

the virtual price increases. Otherwise the constraint is relaxed and the constraint rent declines to US$ 29:2.
1

13

The constrained demand for forest is F C =

PF =PQ AE K
14

1

1

PF
PQ AK

:The virtual price is given by Pv0 = PQ AE K

1

.

Our result concerning returns to scale will hold for homogenous technologies because the value of marginal

productivity is increasing in the degree of homogeneity/returns to scale, k (see Groom and Palmer, 2009).
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15

The Hukou is a residence permit without which access to public goods in other regions, such as health and

education, is denied. Obtaining the hukou is notoriously di¢ cult and presents an administrative hurdle.
16

They may also be ine¤ective if households are self-su¢ cient due to transactions costs (Key et al., 2000) or where

they face a minimum production constraint and lack a fully-functioning output market (Groom et al., 2010).
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1

CRS
Eq 1 (Pk = 24)
Eq 2 (Pk = 24)
k = 0.9
k = 0.7
k = 0.5
k = 0.3

0.8

Beta

0.6
0.4

Honey Production

0.2
0
0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

Alpha

Figure 1: E¢ ciency (Equation 1) and Donor’s preferences (Equation 2) over price intervention and
relaxing constraints: dependence on technology ( ,

10

and returns to scale k =

+ ):

Figures
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1

CRS
Eq 7 (Pk = 24)

0.8

Eq 7 (Pk = 8)
Eq 7 (Pk = 1)
Honey
Production

Beta

0.6

0.4

0.2

0
0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5
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0.7

0.8
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Figure 2: Donor’s preferences over price intervention and relaxing constraints: dependence on
and

and the price of capital (PK ).
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